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The Original Package Ineptitude
Goods brought into a State of the Union, come from
another State or territory of the United States, or from
another country. A State might, in a number of ways,
interfere with this introduction. It might prevent or re-
strain the negotiation, the contract, between its residents
and those of other States or nations, which precedes and
induces the despatch of the goods. It might forbid or
embarrass by onerous restrictions, by requiring licenses
for which fees are exacted, or in other ways, the physical
act of bringing the goods across the State's boundary,
and to any interior point in it. It might penalize or tax
the possession of such goods, the use or the sale of them.
The 7th section of Article 1 of the Constitution con-
fers on Congress the power "to regulate commerce with
foreign nations and among the several States, and with
the Indian tribes," with the qualification that it shall not
tax articles exported from any State, nor give a prefer-
ence to the ports of one State over those of another. This
clause would probably render any other prohibition upon
the States, with respect to interstate or international
commerce, superfluous. The State is, however, explicit-
Dickinson Law Review
ly forbidden to lay duties on imports or exports, ex-
cept for inspection or to lay any duty of tonnage.
In making the preliminary negotiation looking to
sale, or in making the contract of purchase, prior to the
sending of the article bought, to the buyer in State B,
the manufacturer or vendor in State A may despatch
agents, drummers, etc. into State B for the purpose of
soliciting purchases. Whether these agents use samples,
or verbal descriptions is immaterial. State B cannot
absolutely forbid the use of these agents, nor require
them to obtain a license for which they must pay a fee
or tax.1
The taking of goods out of State A into State B, or
the bringing of them from B to A, might be forbidden
or subjected to clogs and restrictions. These restrictions
might conceivably operate directly on the buyer, or the
seller, or his agent, or on the instruments of vehiculation;
on railroad, express and steamboat companies. Under
the Constitution, the agent of an extra-State express
company cannot be required to obtain a license.2 A State
cannot tax the business of transportation out of or into
its territory. It cannot penalize a railroad company for
bringing liquors 3 or other articles of commerce into it,
although for the object of promoting its policy of pre-
venting sales and diminishing consumption. It cannot,
in pursuance of any aim, however worthy, prohibit to
some the navigation of a river, a highway of interstate
traffic, in order to secure a monopoly of the use of it to
another.4
When goods are once within a State, do they become
'Robbins v. Shelby ,County Taxing District (1887) 120 U. S.
489; Asher v. Texas (1888) 128 U. S. 129; Brennan v. Titusville
(1894) 153 U. S. 289.
2Crutcher v. Kentucky (1891) 141 U. S. 47.
3Bowanan v. Chicago, etc., Railway Co., (1888) 125 U. S. 465.
4Gibbons v. Ogden (1824) 9 Wheat. 1.
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wholly subject to its power? May it treat them as it
treats indigenous goods, criminalizing, if it will, or other-
wise restraining the possession, the use, or the sale of
them? Sometimes, in the exercise of a "prohibition"
policy, the State has forbidden the mere presence of li-
quor within its bounds, without regard to its place of
origin, and has authorized the seizure and destruction
of it. Sometimes for the sale of articles introduced from
beyond the State, a preliminary license is exacted, or af-
ter such sale, a tax is imposed on the seller. The em-
ployment of an auctioneer, or drummer or other agency
is subjected to restraint and burdened with a tax. When
a thing which is an article of commerce, has been brought
into a State, it cannot be seized and taken from its owner
because of any law forbidding its introduction. Such
a law is unconstitutional, and the officer who seizes the
article is a trespasser 5 and it can be recovered from him.,
A frequent object of importation is the sale of the
thing imported. Can a State forbid or restrict this sale?
"There is no difference," said Marshall, C. J.,7 "in effect,
between a power to prohibit the sale of an article and a
power to prohibit its introduction into the country.
The one would be a necessary consequence of the other.
No goods (that is, relatively few goods) would be im-
ported, if none could be sold." The right to bring li-
quors8 or cigarettes" or oleomargarine" into a State, de-
'Scott v. Donald (1897) 165 U. S. 58. The South Carolina
Dispensary Law.
,Leisy v. Hardin (1890) 135 U. S. 100; American Express Co.
v. Iowa (1905) 196 U. S. 133. Beer introduced into a State in
violation of its prohibition law.
7Brown v. Maryland (1827) 12 Wheat. 419.
aLeisy v. Hardin (1890) 135 U. S. 100; Lyng v. Michigan
(1890) 135 U. S. 161. Contra, License Cases (1847) 5 Howard
504.
9Austin v. Tennessee (1900) 179 U. S. 343 (implied).
loSchollenberger v. Pennsylvania (1898) 171 U. S. 1.
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spite its eXclusionary policy, carries with it the right to
exemption from the prohibition of selling them.
While not absolutely prohibiting the sale of the in-
troduced goods, the State may attempt to condition the
,right to sell, in a more or less onerous manner. It may,
for example, compel the taking out, at a price, of a li-
cense in advance of the sale. Such eitaction would be
unconstitutional." The State may impose an annual tax
on the business of selling cigarettes, but such a tax, im-
posed on one who sold in the original bulk, cigarettes
brought from another State, would probably be void.12
Can a State tax, as property, a thing which has been
brought into it from outside? Different answers have
been given to the question according to the American
or foreign origin of the thing. If it has been brought
from another country, a certain immunity attaches to it
for a time, which seemingly, will not attach to it, if it has
come from another State. Wines from France still in
the ownership of the importer, and in the casks, barrels,
etc., in which they were imported, 13 and lace still in the
boxes in which it was introduced, 14 could not be taxed
by a State even as property and like other property, not
imported, of the same class.
A tax on the thing imported, whether imposed be-
cause it has been imported, or because it is a thing hav-
ing value, would, it is supposed, be added by the mer-
chant to the price of the thing, and the State imposing
it would thus raise a revenue from the purchasers of the
thing, many of whom would be residents of other States.
"A duty on imports" said Marshall, C. J., "is a tax on
"'Brown v. Maryland (1827) 12 Wheat. 419.
2Cook v. Marshall County (1905) 196 U. S. 261; Austin v.
Tennessee (1900) 179 U. S. 343.
"SLow v. Austin (1671) 13 Wall. 29; Hinson v. Lott (1868) 8
Wall. 148; American Steel Co. v. speed (1904) 192 U. S. 500.
"4May v. New Orleans (1900) 178 U. S. 496.
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the article, which is paid by the consumer. The great
importing States would thus levy a tax on the non-im-
porting States."'15
It seems, however, that goods introduced from other
States are not exempt from a non-discriminatory State
taxation, if they are no longer in transitu, but have reach-
ed their destination. By a narrow interpretation of the
word "imports" which confines the application of the
word to exotic goods, the prohibition on a State of lay-
ing "any imposts or duties on imports or exports,"16 is
held not to extend to goods brought from one State,
whether by water or land, into another.17 A tax on the
thing brought into State A from State B is not an im-
post or a duty on an import. Is it not however an inter-
ference with interstate commerce? If the thing in the
original bulk, and in the hands of the person who intro-
duced it into the State, may be taxed, it may, to employ
the logic of Marshall, C. J., be taxed high as well as low;
its price may be increased, and its vendibleness corres-
pondingly reduced. The belief of the Chief Justice8
that the principle applicable to importations from abroad
is applicable to "importations (sic) from a sister State,"
has been rejected in later cases. "The several States,
therefore" says White, J.,'9 "not being controlled as to
such merchandise (from other States) by the prohibi-
tion against the taxation of imports, it was held that
the States had the power, after the goods had reached
their destination, and were held for sale (even in the or-
iginal package) to tax them without discrimination, like
15Brown v. Maryland (1827) 12 Wheat. 419.
16Const. Art. 1, sect. 10.
l7Brown v. Maryland (1827) 12 Wheat. 419; American Steel
Co. v. Speed (1904) 192 U. S. 500; Brown v. Houston (1885) 114
U. S. 622; Woodruff v. Parham (1868) 8 Wall, 123.
IsBrown v. Maryland (1,827) 12 Wheat. 418.
29American Steel Co. v. Speed (1904) 192 U. S. 500.
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other property situated within the State."'20 A tax upon
cne, as an auctioneer or commission merchant, on ac-
count of sales of goods brought from another State, if
not discriminatory against goods of other States, is
valid, -' 1 as is a requirement that one who peddles goods,
even goods from another State, shall obtain a license.
2"2
The entrance of goods from a foreign country or
from another State cannot be constitutionally prevented
by a State, nor can the use or sale of such goods. How
long does this immunity last? A thing that has been
imported never ceases to have been imported. Is it for-
ever superior to the jurisdiction of the State?
It is clear that if all trace of the ex-
traneous origin of a thing should be lost,
it could no longer be exempt from
the State's power. Are there any other limitations?
Will wine which has come from France be beyond State
taxation so long as its source is known? Will beer that
has been brought into a prohibition State be always ven.
dible despite the local law?
The first attempt to define the conditions with
which the import must continue to comply, in order to
preserve its franchise, was made by Chief Justice Mar-
shall. "When the importer has so acted on the thing
imported, that it has become incorporated and mixed up
with the mass of property in the country, it has," he
remarks, somewhat timidly, "perhaps lost its distinctive
character as an import, and has become subject to the
20Brown v. Houston (1885) 114 U. S. 622; Hinson v. Lott
(1868) 8 Wall. 148.
2Woodruff v. Parham (1868) 8 Wall. 123; Ficklen v. Shelby
County (1892) 145 U. S. 1.
"Emert v. Missouri (1895) 156 U. S. 296; MIachine Go. v.
Gage (1879) 100 U. S. 676. A tax special to peddlers of goods
from another State would be void. Welton v. Missouri (1875)
91 U. S. 275; Walling v. Michigan (1886) 116 U. S. 446; Tiernau"
v. Rinker (1880) 102 U. S. 123.
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taxing power of the State; but while remaining the pro-
perty of the importer in his warehouse, in the original
form or package in which it was imported, a tax upon
it is too plainly a duty on imports to escape the prohibi-
tion in the constitution." Later cases have applied these
tests, not merely to "imports" in the narrow sense of
that word,23 but to articles introduced from one State
to another.24
The incorporation and mixing up with the mass of
the property of the State is manifestly no test. One pint
of water can be "mixed up" with another pint, and the
molecules of the respective pints be indistinguishable.
But such "mixing up" is not the object of the justice's
contemplation. The evidence that a given thing was
imported may be lost; and it might be said to be "in-
corporated" with, "mixed up" with, the mass of prop-
erty. But, how can a thing, e. g. a sewing machine, an
automobile, signs of whose foreign make are indelible, be
said with any propriety to be 'mixed up" with anything
else? One occupies one spot, and another another spot.
They are not transfused into each other. They remain
separately perceptible, numerable, and identifiable.
"Incorporating," "mixing up," are evidently figures of
speech and not objective facts.
The first palpable fact mentioned by the Chief Jus-
tice as a test is that the thing remains the property of
the importer. Though no change is wrought on the
thing imported, though it remains in the same case or
package in which it was introduced, it loses the immuni-
23May v. Now Orleans (1900) 178 U. S. 496 (lace); Low v.
Austin (1871) 13 Wall. 29 (wine).
24Pervear v. Mlassachusetts (1866) 5 Wall. 475 (liquors);
Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania (1898) 171 U. S. 1. (oleomarga-
rine); Leisy v. Hardin (1890) 135 U. S. 100 (beer); Vance v.
Vandercook Co. (1898) 170 U. S. 438 (liquor); American Ex-
press Co. v. Iowa (1905) 196 U. S. 133 (liquor).
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ties of an import, when it ceases to belong to the import-
er. The State can tax it after his sale; it can tax the
sale of it by his vendee, 2 5 it can prohibit and penalize the
sale of it by his vendee .2  It is declared to become min-
gled with the general mass of property in the State, by
the importer's act of selling it, even "in the original pack-
age.,27
But, even before a sale of it, the importer may pro-
duce effects of various sorts upon it. The suggestion
that the thing must remain in the importer's warehouse
must probably not be taken seriously. The article must
first get to the warehouse. While going thither it is an
import. From the warehouse it may be taken to a store
for sale, or to a factory for the reception of some change
of form or quality. While going from the warehouse,
while exposed in the store for sale, it would probably
not be held to have lost its import-immunity.
But the importer may break the original bulk form-
ed by the things imported and their case and inclosure
separating its parts from each other, with a view either
to his own consumption of them, the manufacture or the
sale of them. By so doing, although he remains the
owner, the articles have ceased, though still in fact an
import, to be an import in law. The constitutional privi-
leges of an import fall away from it. In May v. New
Orleans28 lace had been put into cartons, each containing
twelve pieces, and each piece twelve yards. The cartons
had been placed together in a box or case. Small pack-
ages of towels, containing two, three or five dozens, had
been put together in a wooden case. In these cases the
goods entered the country. They were broken open, but
25Waring v. Mayor (1868) 8 Wall. 110.
26Pervear v. Masschusetts (1866) 5 Wall. 475.
2 tVance v. Vandercook Co. (1898) 170 U. S. 438.
28(1900) 178 U. S. 496. That breaking bulk destroys the im-
munity, is asserted in Low v. Austin (1871) 13 Wall. 29.
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the contained packages were not individually broken. It
was held that, though they were still the property of the
importer, the lace and towels could be taxed by the State.
The reason assigned by Marshall, C. J., for the free-
dom of imported goods from State control until a sale or
a breach of the bulk of the package by the importer, is,
-in brief, this. The goods are imported in order to be
sold. If the State can prohibit a sale, it can practically
prohibit importation. If it can tax at all the import, or
the act of importation, it can tax so heavily as practically
to prohibit importation. With this logic before him it
is singular that he should concede that the import lost
its exemption from State control as soon as the original
bulk was broken, or as soon as it was sold unbroken. Im-
portation takes place with a view to wholesale or to re-
tail. There cannot be a retail sale, even by the importer,
without breach of the original package, unless the pack-
age has been made to contain no more of the article ti-an
the consumer would buy at retail. If it is true tn'G "no
goods would be imported if none could be sold," it is like-
wise true that no goods would be imported for retail sale
if none could be sold at retail. In order to preserve the
power to import for retail, it is necessary to preserve the
power of the importer to sell at retail. But this power
is virtually taken from him, when on the one hand, he is
prevented from opening his package, if he would avoid
State obstructions to sale, and on the other hand, incon-
venience or judicial decision, posing as law, compels him.
to employ large packages. If wine is put into separate
pint or quart packages, cloth into separate parcels of
four or six yards, shoes into separate boxes containing
one pair, the inconvenience and the expense of transpor-
tation, and the risk of loss of or injury to the articles im-
ported, will be seriously increased. Beginning with the
assumption that any one has, as against a State, the
right to import anything into it, and the right to sell
what he imports ,it seems almost infantile to add that if
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he breaks his packages, he loses the freedom from State
control, and therefore he must import to sell only at
wholesale or he must increase the cost of importation by
employing unbusinesslike packages.
Why should the constitutional right to import and
sell, depend on the size or form of the package? Why
should it be confined to sales of the whole package at one
time, to one person, or group of persons? If it really
was the intention of the constitution-makers to take from
the State the power to prevent sales at wholesale and
sales at retail, by importers, why not frankly say so, and
hold as a corollary, that it was their intention that the
importer should be able to consult convenience of trade,
with regard to the size of the packages in which he
brings the goods, and the size of the portion of them,
which he disposes of in any particular sale? To impute
to the framers of the constitution the intention to give
a right superior to the State to import big packages, only,
and to sell the whole package only, would be to suspect
them of imbecility. Nor is there the slightest intima-
tion in the constitution itself, of its intention to distin-
guish between the commerce that requires big and that
which requires little packages, or between the power of
the merchant to sell at wholesale, and to sell at retail,
that which he imports. 29 Any line of demarcation be-
tween federal and State power over commerce, which
practically subjects importations for retail to the State,
while exempting from it those for wholesale is, it is not
too much to say, arbitrary and absurd.
But, conceding that the retailing importer is practi-
cally not protected from State control, by the constitution
as interpreted by the Supreme Court, is the wholesale
29Cf. Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania (1898) 171 U. S. 1, where
the sale to the consumer of ten pound tubs of oleomargarine, in-
troduced from another Stafte, was held permissible despite the
State's prohibitory law.
Dickinson Law Review
importer in any better plight? A has imported a cask
of wine, or a box of laces. He would not do this unless
he could sell. He cannot subdivide and sell it, so he loses
at least one-half of his motive to import. He cannot sell
to consumers or to small dealers. The class of his cus-
tomers is straitened. But, if A sells the unbroken bulk,
his purchaser, B, buys it, in order that he may break it
and sell its parts. But, the State can now intervene.
It can tax B on account of his sales. It may confiscate
the goods, while in the unbroken package, even, or it
may criminalize the selling of them. A, let us suppose,
has introduced a tub of oleomargarine containing 200 lbs.
into a State which makes it a crime to have for sale or
to sell oleomargarine. The constitution gives him the
right, in defiance of the State, to sell the tub to B. But
why should B buy? As soon as he becomes the owner
of it, if he holds it for sale, he becomes a criminal. B
buys, if at all, in order that he may sell. The State
prevents his selling. Virtually, then, the State prevents,
his buying. As "no goods would be imported if none
could be sold, ' ' 30 no goods would be bought for sale, if
none could be sold. But if the State prevents B's buying,
(and B stands for everybody within the state except A)
it prevents A's selling. If it prevents A's selling it pre-
vents A's importing, for sale. The result is, that the
doctrine that one sale even in the original package, or
the breach of the package, even by the importer, removes
all restrictions from State control, virtually subjects the
importation itself to State control, if the reasoning in
Brown v. Maryland has any validity.
It is not my purpose to indicate any other constitu-
tional restraints on State interference with commerce.
Possibly should a State undertake to forbid the sale of
silk, or iron, or beef, or leather, its action would be con-
3OMarshall, C. J., in Brown v. Maryland (1827) 12 Wheat.
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demned under some other clause of the Constitution.
What it is here meant to say, is that under the interpre-
tation imposed on it by the courts, the commerce clause
of the Constitution is of little value, and the immunities
tendered by it are largely illusory.
Brown v. Maryland and other cases have held that A
can import and sell once, in the original package, any-
thing which is recognized by congress to be an article of
commerce, whether it be oleomargarine 1 or beer 2 or to-
bacco. 3 The effort of the State to prevent such impor-
tation, or such sale, is a usurpation. As the courts had
hampered commerce by holding that if the importer, in
order to make a sale, broke the package, he ipso facto
lost the power to make the sale if the State forbade it,
sensible men would easily be conducted to the conclusion
that the constitution makers, for some reason, looked
with disfavor on original package breaches. They re-
ward the sale whole with immunity from local control,
they punish the breach of the crate, box, etc., or the
sale of the separated parts by subjecting the sale of all
the parts to that control. To practical men, desiring to
preserve the national and exclude the State jurisdiction,
the suggestion of a policy was not tardy. Inconvenient
and riskful, and expensive as the use of small packages
would be, said they, we must undergo it. We have a
right to import and to sell, if only we do not break bulk.
We have a right even to retail, if only we do not break
bulk. Let us then use packages small enough to be sold
without division.
In Austin v. Tennessee8' this endeavor to secure a
RSchollenberger v. Pennsylvania (1898) 171 U. S. 1.
32Leisy v. Hardin (1890) 135 U. S. 100.
33Austin v. Tennessee (1900) 179 U. S. 343; Cook v.
Marshall County (1905) 196 U. S. 261.
34(1900) 179 U. S. 348.
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constitutional right was made. Congress had required
that cigarettes should be put up in pasteboard packages
of 10, 20, 50, or 100. Cigarettes put up in packages of
ten were sold at Durham, N. C., .to Austin, a citizen of
Tennessee. Pasteboard boxes were piled on the floor of
the factory. The express company's employee came for
them, carrying with him a basket into which he put
them, and which he placed upon the cars. Arrived at
its destination, an agent of the company took the basket
to Austin's store, poured its contents upon his counter
and carried the basket away. A law of Tennessee made
it criminal to sell cigarettes. This law was invalid, so
far as applicable to a first sale in the original package.
A phase is used by Brown, J., the writer of the opin-
ion, which suggests that possibly there was no original
package, and that, if there was none, there was no right
to import the articles. It is startling to learn, even by
an insinuation, that a State has absolute power over im-
portations, if no packages are used. The constitution
says not a word about packages. If live stock, horses,
cattle, sheep, if coal or iron, is put aboard a ship in no
inclosure, are we to be told that the importation of these
things is not commerce?
But, there were enclosufes of the cigarettes. There
were pasteboard boxes. These were the first enclosures,
and therefore, in one sense, the "original" packages.
These packages were thrown into a basket, but, not by
the vendor. Nor was the basket the vendor's. Nor was
it intended to be left with the vendee. The vendee did
not get possession of the cigarettes while they were in
the basket. Of it he never had possession. Generally,
the original package is the package in which the import-
er receives the thing imported; it is a part of the import-
ed bulk. It is for him to say whether, when and how
the bulk shall be broken. Austin had no such power
ever the basket. There is a feeble suggestion neverthe-
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less, that the basket was the original package. The
ship's hold in which coal is imported, the car in which
it is brought into the State, would be as much an original
package, for they prevent the coal's laterally spreading,
and the change of their place is the change of place of
their contents.
Not willing, however, to place the decision of the
case on the ground that the basket was the original pack-
age, or that there was no original package, and therefore
ro commerce over which congress, and not the State, had
control, Brown, J., provisionally conceding that each
pasteboard box was the original package, proceeds to lay
down a new principle, viz., that not every originol pack-
age can be sold by the importer despite the State's pro-
hibition, but only original packages of a certain size. The
size is not determined by naming its cubical dimensions,
or the material which encloses the bulk, but is defined in
part by history, and in part by intention. The paclage,
we are informed must be in the "form in which from
time immemorial, foreign goods have been brought into
the country." But, these cigarettes were not foreign
goods. Foreign goods are of infinite variety, and they
do not all come in the same kind of packages. Silks do
not come in casks, nor potatoes in pasteboard boxes. New
kinds of goods are from time to time brought into the
country. Suppose a kind of package has been used 25
years past only. Will it be deemed to have been used
from time immemorial? Cigarettes have not existed
from time immemorial. But why attempt to put a judi-
cial straight-jacket upon business? Why is the mer-
chant not allowed to use whatever kind of package con-
venience, economy, or even caprice suggests? Why put
the business of the country under the yoke of a petty
abstraction? If a merchant chooses to use a little pack-
age, why deprive him of the right to make a sale, which
he would have had, had it been a big package?
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Another test, however, is intimated. It is suggest-
ed that the use of some packages is bona fide, and that
of others mala fide. The size must be that of "packages
in which bona fide transactions are carried on between
-the manufacturer and the wholesale dealer residing in
different States." This means, apparently, that if a
man wants to enjoy the constitutional right of importing
into a State and of selling therein an article of which it
unconstitutionally prohibits the introduction and sale,
and he adopts such packages as will make this right
fruitful, he ipso facto forfeits that right. The court
practically says to him, you have a right to import and
sell in the original package. We will not tell you how
large absolutely your package must be. This, however,
we will tell you. If you make your packages so small,
that you can sell them to consumers, and small dealers,
and if it is one of your objects in adopting your pack-
age, to sell to those persons, we will hold that you can-
not sell to them, even in the original packages. You must
let the State balk your commerce to a large degree. You
must allow it to prevent a large number of sales, to large
classes of persons, and if you select a package so small
that you can sell it to many persons, to consumers, and
small dealers, you will, by that very selection, make the
State's prohibition effectual. Introduce big packages
and sell them to the few that can be persuaded to buy,
with the knowledge that they cannot, in turn, sell; but do
not introduce little packages, with the intention to sell
to those who do not need or want to sell in turn. Yoa
are superior to State law, the constitution makes you so,
but only if you do not try to be superior. If you try to
be superior, you shall, ipso facto, become subject to it.
The State cannot control sales to consumers, in original
packages, but if you adapt your packages to consumers,
the State shall control your sales even in these pack-
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ages.3  In short, the merchant must enjoy his constitu-
tional exemption from State interference with commerce,
in moderation. He must be content that one hundredth
or one thousandth of it is exempt.
There is, in Austin v. Tennessee, a sad note of convic-
tion that the package test has broken down. "While
this court," says Brown, J., "has been alert to protect
the rights of non-resident citizens, and has felt it its
duty, not always with the approbation of the State courts,
to declare the invalidity of laws throwing obstacles in
the way of free inter-communication between the States,
it will not lend its sanction to those who deliberately
plan to debauch the public conscience, and set at naught
the laws of a State." But in Brown v. Maryland, and
in many other cases, the party has "set at naught the
laws of the State," and the Supreme Court has abetted
him. He has refused to pay a tax, which the State has
commanded him to pay. He has sold oleomargarine or
beer in defiance of State prohibition. The Supreme
Court has applauded him, holding that the State was
commanding or prohibiting what it had no constitutional
power to command or prohibit. That is what Austin and
Cook held. Wherein were they worse than Leisy, or
Brown, or Schollenberger? If Austin was debauching
the public conscience what was Leisy doing? The for-
mer sold cigarettes; the latter beer. Of whom was the
business the more demoralizing?
It is difficult to understand the peculiar scruple of
the court, in thinking it right to oppose a State law, ,if
you want to sell big packoges, which you have not adapt-
ed to a consumer's need, and in thinking it wrong to op-
pose the same law, if you want to sell packages, to many
buyers, to whose needs you have adapted them.
Has not the time arrived to abandon the judge-made
canon that the immunity of an import from State con-
35A similar view is expressed by the same judge in Cook v.
Marshall County (1905) 196 U. S. 261, another cigarette case.
The pasteboard boxes were shovelled loose into a car. No basket
or enclosure other ahan the car was used,
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trol, depends upon its remaining in the form in which
it first appeared within the State, and in the ownership
of the importer, or, retaining that, to concede the right
of the importer to import for retail, and in packages de-
signedly adapted, without breach, to purchase by con-
sumers ?3
"This article, by William Trickett, appeared in 1906 in the
Columbia Lww Review.
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MOOT COURT
McKEE v. X TOWNSHIP
Negligence - Boroughs -Streets-Dedication of Streets-Accept-
ance by Municipality
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Johnston, owning a farm, made a lane five thousand feet long
through it which connected two highways, one on each side. This
he did to accommodate certain tenmnt farmers of his, and also the
public. This lane continued to be used by travellers for the
space of fifteen years, but the supervisors never made any re-
pairs on it, nor did any acts recognizing in it a public road. Deep
holes formed in the lane which were often filled by -the owner of
the farm through which it ran. One was found and not filled up
by the owner. McKee, not living in the neighborhood, attempted
to drive over the lane at night; his buggy was capsized, and him-
self injured. He sues the township for neglecting to make the
necessary repairs.
Kane, for plaintiff.
Lee, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
LICHTENSTEIN, J. The question of law is whether the title
to the road is in the township or in Johnston, the builder. The
authorities are extremely numerous on the point, but it is only
necessary to mention the leading ones.
Gibson, C. J., in Gowen v. The Philadelphia Exchange Co.,
5 W. & S. 141, reviewed the authorities -prior to that time, tracing
the law from the early English decisions to the present time. He
then reached the conclusion that "an owner of land may make
a limited dedication in favor of the public, resumable at his own
pleasure, or may suffer a permissive use by the public for all pur-
poses of passage, jointly with himself, without in any degree im-
pairing his right to terminate such privilege at any time." Grif-
fin's Appeal, 109 Pa. 150, subsequently decided, supports this
contention.
When there is no other evidence of a dedication than the
mere fact of a public user, so that the right claimed by the pub-
lic is purely prescriptive, it is essential, to maintain it, that the
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user or enjoyment should be adverse, uninterrupted and exclusive
for the period of twenty-one years. Commonwealth v. Cole, 26
Pa. 187; Schent&y v. Commonwealth, 36 Pa, 29. Since the facts
clearly show that the use and enjoyment of the road was for a
period of but fifteen years, the above authorities do not apply to
the case at bar. In Commonwealth v. Moorehead, 118 Pa. 344, and
Weida v. Hanover Township, 30 Pa. Super. Ct. 424, it is held that
though a dedication may be presumed in eight or even six years,
in such case acceptance by the township, either tacit or express,
must be shown. Here clearly there was no acceptance, for the
township never made claim to the road, nor repaired it, nor did
anything toward keeping it in repair. Ownership was exerted
over it in no way.
In Steel v. Huntingdon Boro., 191- Pa. 627, it was held: "Pro-
prietors of land lying within the territorial limits of a borough
cannot lay it out in lots and streets as their personal interest may
suggest, and thereby impose, without the assent of the borough,
the duty of keeping those streets in repair, or subjecting it to
damages for injuries which persons may sustain in passing or at-
tempting to pass over them. The borough must do something
to indicate its acceptance of them as public highways to render
it liable for injuries sustained upon them. Mere Silence on its
part is not sufficient to do so."
In Downing v. Coatesville Boro., 214 Pa. 291, it was held:
"No recovery can be had from a borough for personal injuries sus-
tained by a fall into a hole in a street where it appears that the
portion of the street in which the hole was located had been
dedicated to public use by an adjoining landowner for his own
convenience, but had never been accepted by the borough as a
public act."
In the very recent case of Cunius v. Edwardsville Boro., 63
Pa. Super. Ct. 118, it iwas held: "Where an owner of a building
abutting on a sidewalk sets back the building, but still continues
to use the portion of the sidewalk previously covered by the
building for the purpose of displaying goods, and the municipal-
ity does not by ordinance, or by any other act assume control of
such space, the municipality cannot be held liable for injuries
sustained by a person who fell into a hole in that place.
The above authorities, many of which are on substantially
the same facts as the case at bar, conclusively show that in the
absence of evidence showing an adverse user for a period of
twenty-one years, or dedication by the owner and acceptance by
the township, the township is not liable in an action for damages
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for personal injuries sustained by an individual on the road in
the township. We therefore render judgment for the defendant.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
The lane in question, was used by travellers for the space of
15 years. This use was not sufficiently long to make a right in
the public by adverse user.
Was there then an accepted dedication? Apparently, there
was a dedication. The lane was opened partly to accommodate
certain tenants of Johnston, but "also the public." We may per-
haps, interpret this as a dedication to the public. But a dedica-
tion does not make a highway, until there has been an acceptance
by the public. Official acceptance, there was not. The super-
visors never made any repairs on the lane, nor did other acts by
which they would have recognized that it was a public road.
The public at large, may, however, it seems, accept by user, a
dedicated way. Each traveller, in using the way, is acting for
himself, and not as the representative of the State or of any mu-
nicipal subdivision of it. Yet, when the number of the travellers
so using this way, is considerable, and the use extends over a
considerable time, their acts are combined in imagination and they
become a species of agent of the public to accept. "The accept-
ance may be," -ays Dillon, Municipal Corp. 5th Ed., sections 1079,
1081, 1086, "by the public at large, and need not be by * * * mu-
nicipal or corporate authorities, acting on behalf of the public."
Cited, Kniss v. Borough of Duquesne, 255 Pa. 417.
The evidence of this user and of its extent, however, should
be more distinct than it is. The lane "continued to be used by
travellers for the space of 15 years,' but how many travellers?
how frequently? The use of a few persons dwelling on the lane,
could hardly convert it into a public road, and cast on the town-
ship the duty of repairing it.
Affirmed.
HIBBARD v. TOMKINS
Negligence-Partnership--Joint Tort-feasors---Prior Suit
Against One Partner-Res Adjudicata
STATEMENT OF FAICTS
Tomkins and Slater were patners in the business of trans-
potting goods from point to -point. Sliter operated the truck.
In doing so, he injured Hibbard, who sued him, alleging negli-
gence, and recovered $1000 damages. Without issuing execution,
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he now brings this action against Tomkins, for the same injury,
and recovers $1200. Motion for judgment non obstante verdicto.
Feldman, for the -plaintiff.
Goldberg, for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
GOODYEAR, J. It is stated in text books that the members
of a partnership are jointly and severally liable for the debts and
liabilities of the partnership. This being true, -we are certain
that the plaintiff in this action could have recovered from the
two members of the partnership had he sued them in a joint action.
But the question to decide in this case is whether, having re-
covered judgment from the one member for the injury, he can
recover from the other partner in a separate action.
It was held in Bolton v. Hey, et al., 168 Pa. 418, that "a
judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on the
merits is a bar to any future suit between the same parties or
their privities, either in the same court, or any other court, so
long as it remains unreversed, unvacated, and not annulled." It
has also been decided in this state that "the judgment of a court
of proper jurisdiction puts an end to further litigation on ac-
count of the same subject matter, and becomes the law of the
case which can not be altered, even by the consent of the parties,
and it is binding on not only them, but on courts and juries ever
afterwards, so long as it remains in force and unreversed." See
Dalzell v. London and Lancashire Fire Ins. Co., 252 Pa. 266.
'The law in England as well as in this country, according to
the opinion of Brown, J., in the case of MbFarlane v. Kipp, 206
Pa. 317, is that a judgment rendered against one of several per-
sons bars action against the others, even though the latter were
dormant partners of the defendant in the original action, and this
fact was unknown to the plaintiff when he began suit. Brown,
J., continues by quoting from Smith v. Black, 9 S. & R. 142, as
follows: 'iI am of the opinion that the law iwill not suffer this
splitting up either of actions or severing of persons, and that
where the cause of action is a joint one, a judgment once render-
ed extinguishes the original cause of action, and is a bar, not only
to a subsequent action brought against the same persons, but
against all others; that the judgment puts an end to -all litigation
on the subject matter of the action, and that the discovery of a
new partner or new damages does not give rise to a new cause of
action." This doctrine is endorsed in Mason v. Eldred, 73 U. S.
231.
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While the above citations deal with contractual relations, in
Sessions v. Johnson, 95 U. S. 347, it is stated that many n odifi-
cations of the rule laid down in Mason v. Eldred, supra, arise
where the controversy grows out of the tortious acts of the de-
fendant. Where trespass is committed by several persons, the
injured party may sue any or all of the wrongdoers, but he can
have but one satisfaction for the same injury, the same as in an
action of assumpsit for breach of contract. McFarlane v. Kipp,
supra, refers to this rule and states: "A judgment against one
upon a joint contract of several persons, bars an action against
the others, though the latter were dormant partners of the de-
fendant in the original action, and this fact was not known to
the plaintiff when the action commenced.
There can be but one final judgment in any personal action
whether it is founded in contract or tort, which doctrine is sup-
ported in McFarlane v. Kipp, supra, and United States v. Ames,
99 U. S. 35.
The rule, that which has been judicially determined shall not
be made the subject of controversy, extends to every question in
the proceeding which was legally cognizable, and it applies where
a party has neglected the opportunity of trial, or has failed to
present his cause in whole or in part, under the mistaken belief
that it would remain open and would be the subject of another
proceeding. In order, however, to act as an effectual bar, it
must appear that the cause of action is the same in substance,
and can be sustained by the same evidence. Chas. Schwan et al.
v. Kelly and Moore, 173 Pa. 65; City of Corry v. Corry Chair Co,
18 Pa. Super. Ct. 271.
The learned counsel for the plaintiff in the case at bar bases
his case almost entirely on the Act of Assembly passed April
6, 1830, P. L. 277, -which provides that "in actions against part-
ners where service is had on only one, judgment must be entered
against him who was served, and the plaintiff may have a sub-
sequent action against those not served." The provisions of
that Act are not applicable to this case according to a decision
in Lewis v. Williams, 6 Wharton 263. The court in interpreting
the Act of 1830, held: "Wherever the plaintiff does not claim
against the partnership but against the -individual, and secures
judgment against him 'whom he regards as the sole debtor, the
act has no application." It is also stated in Moore v. Hepburn,
5 Pa. 399, that the act applies only when service was desired on
both members of the partnership and secured on only one."
The argument of the counsel for the plaintiff has no direct
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bearing on the case -at bar, because there is no evidence that the
plaintiff attempted to secure service on the defendant when
he sued the partner who was driving the truck.
For the reasons herein stated the motion is sustained and
judgment n. o. v. entered for the defendant.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
A contract made by a partnership is joint, and the action
on it must be brought against all the partners. But in respect
to torts, the rule is different. The Act of 'March 26, 1915,
P. L. 18, in its 18th section makes the partners liable for any
wrongful act or omission of any partner to one who is not a
member of the firm. The 15th section declares that all part-
ners are liable "jointly and severally for every thing charge-
able to the partnership under sections 13 and 14." This is the
rule declared in the text booksi Gilmore, Partnerships, p. 236
324, 549.
The question before us is having sued less than all of the
partners for a tort, will the plaintiff be permitted to sustain
a subsequent action against those not sued? Says Gilmore,
p. 237, a judgment against less than all, in an action against
them, is "held in England to be a bar to a subsequent action
against the others, even though it remains unsatisfied."' He
adds however, "In this country it is generally held that an un-
satisfied judgment against one or more of several joint tort-
feasors, is no bar to a subsequent action against the others."
Betcher v. McChesney, 255 Pa. 394.
Slater was the actual tort-feasor. The other partner is
liable, because Slater was the agent of the firm. To Tompkins
the wrong is imputed. In the Betcher case, it is held that if
a judgment in a separate action against the actual tort-feaser,
a servant or agent, is recovered, it will bar a later action
against the tort-feasor who is such by imputation only.
If this is sound, it is probable that the decision of the court
below is correqt. The judgment is therefore -affirmed.
WATTS v. HOAGLAND
,Deed-Breach of Covenant-Measure of Damages
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Hoagland, owning a tract of land in a distant county, which
he had not seen for ten years, and which had been, and, as he
supposed, continued to be, covered with oak and hemlock timber,
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conveyed the land by a deed which described It as covered rwith
oak .and hemlock, and containing a covenant of warranty. The
timber had been cut and taken by trespassers. Watts, on dis-
covering the facts, brought an action of assumpsit on the cov-
enant. The court told the jury that (1) the action lay, (2)
the damage would be the value of the timber, not exceeding the
price paid for the land by the plaintiff to the defendant. The
price paid for the land was $5000. The evidence was that the
timber was worth $5000. Verdict for $5000. Motion for a
new trial.
Speicher, for plaintiff.
Shuey, for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
DAVIES, J. At common law, assumpsit lay for the recovery
of damages for breach of a simple contract; i. e., a promise not
under seal. It lay chiefly for money lent, paid or received, a
balance due on account, goods sold, services rendered, use and
occupation, etc. It differed from the action of debt in that
the latter was founded upon a contract either in deed or in
law, in which the thing demanded was certain, not merely an
action for 'damages; and it differed from the action of covenant
in that the latter lay for the recovery of damages for the
breach of any agreement under seal. But by the Act of May
25, 1887, P. L. 271, a considerable change was made. The old
common law actions of assumpsit, covenant and debt were
merged into one action, known as assumpsit. So at the present
time the action of assumpsit lies in all cases where the action
of assumpsit, covenant or debt formerly lay.
In the case before us the land was conveyed by a deed,
which, according to Black's Law Dictionary, is "a sealed instru-
menvt, containing a contract or covenant, delivered by the party
to be bound thereby, and accepted by the party to whom the
contract or covenant runs." At common law the action for the
recovery of damages for the breach of any agreement under
seal was the action of covenant. Since this action has been
merged into the action of assumpsit, the vendee in the case before
us has brought a proper action for the breach of a covenant
of warranty.
There can be no doubt but that the vendee was entitled
to a remedy. In Erwin v. Myers, 46 Pa. 96, Strong, J., said:
"If the vendor's covenant be broken the vendee has several rem-
edies; he may rescind the contract, or at his election may bring
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an action at law to recover damages, or institute a proceeding
in equity to enforce specific performance. In Kerr v. Kitchen,
7 P 486, and Dorsey v. Jackman, 1 S. & R. 42, it was admit-
ited that the purchase money paid under an executed deed can
be recovered back for defect in title if there was a warranty.
In Wolf v. Christman, 202 Pa. 475, it rues held that where a
vendee of a lot buys in reliance on a warranty or express rep-
resentation by the vendor as to the depth of the lot, he is
not within the rule of caveat emptor. A parol declaration of
a vendor at the time he delivered the deed that he would make
it good if deficient in quantity -was held sufficient to entitle the
vendee to a, deduction for the deficiency. Frederick v. Campbell,
14 S. & R. 293.
The defendant's second point in his motion for a new trial
is that the court erred in charging the jury in regard to the
damages. The court charged that the damage would be the
value of the timber, not exceeding the price paid for the land
by the plaintiff to the defendant. In Tyson v. Eyrick, 141 Pa.
296, Clark, J., said: "The law in Pennsylvenia is well settled.
Where the contract is executed by deed, with covenants of gen-
eral warranty, the rule undoubtedly is that the measure of dam-
ages for failure of title, in the absence of fraud, is limited to
the purchase money and interest, or in other words, to the price
of the land at the date of the deed, whether the consideration
consist of services, land or money." The same view is expressed
in Bender v. Fromberger, 4 Dall. 436; Lanegan v. Kille, 97 Pa.
120; McClure v. Gamble, 27 Pa. 288; Brown v. Dickerson, 12 Pa.
372.
iIn Martin and Jacob's Appeal, 2 Pa. Super. Ct. 67, it was
held: "On a partial breach of warranty compensation is based
on the value of the land affected by the breach, as compared
with the whole, and not on the relative quantity. In a convey-
ance with a general marranty, damages for a breach of war-
ranty as to part of the land would be based on its relative value
and not on its relative quantity."
In Beaupland v.; IKeen, 28 Pa. 124, the following rule -was
laid down: "The rule for estimating damages for failure or de-
fect of title, to a part of the land conveyed, is the relative value
which the part taken away bears to the whole, and that is to
be estimated with regard to the price fixed by the parties for
the Waole tract."
In Hertzog v. Hertzog, 34 Pa. 418, in an action of assump-
sit for the breach of a parol contract for the conveyance of land
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in consideration of money paid and services rendered, it was
held, overruling Jacks v. McKee, 9 Pa. 235, and kindred cases,
that the damages are to be measured by the amount of the con-
sideration, and by the value of the land. To a similar effect are
Dumars v. Miller, 34 Pa. 319; Graham v. Graham, 34 Pa. 475;
Bowser v. Cissno, 62 Pa. 148 and Burk v. Serril, 80 Pa. 413.
In Fuller v. Mulhollan, 40 Pa. Super. Ct. 257, it was held that
where a certain acreage of land (coal) was sold, and it turned
out that a portion of the coal had -been previously mined, the
measure of the vendee's damages is the proportion which the
coal mined out bears to that which remains in the land, with
reference to the consideration agreed to be paid.
In Mengel v. Williamson, 50 Pa. Super. Ct. 100, in an action
of assumpsit for the breach of warranty of title or seisin as
to part only of the land conveyed- the damage is the relative
value which the part bears to the whole, and this is to be esti-
mated with regard to the price fixed by the parties for the
-whole. This is the general rule in Pennsylvania.
"The measure of damages is the value of the land at the
time of the conveyance, as measured by the consideration -paid,
without reference to any increase in value, whether caused by
the development of the neighborhood or improvements in the
hInd itself." Tiffany 913. In such cases it is competent for
either party to give evidence of peculiar advantages or disad-
vantages of the part lost, and reasonable latitude should be
allowed while the inquiry is confined to the proper point. Either
party may produce evidence to show the relative value which
the part taken away bears to the whole.
In applying these rules for the measure of damages to the
case before us, we are unable to see any error in the charge of
the court. The evidence showed that the timber was worih
$5000. That left but one conclusion, that the land in itself was
of no value. He charged in substance "The measure of damages
is the proportion of purchase money lost by failure of title."
The motion of the defendant for a new trial is dismissed.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
The damages recovered should be such fraction of the
$5000, the price of the tract, as would be expressed by the ratio
of the value of the timber on it (found to be $5000) to -the actual
value of the land and the timber at the time of sale. The con-
tract price was $5000, but possibly the land without the timber
would have been worth $1000, and the timber $5000 additional.
The damages from the non-existence of the timber would 'then
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be five-sixths of the contract price, and not $5000. The instruc-
tion of the trial court might have been more exact. It does
rot follow fromn the fact that the timber would have been worth
$5000, and that the price paid for both land and supposititious
timber, was only $5000, that the land was worth or was assum-
ed by the parties, to be worth nothing.
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BOOK REVIEW
A Treatise on the Law of Conversion, by Reno D. Bowers;
Litle, Brown & Co., Boston, 1917.
This is a much better book than the perusal of the unintelli-
gible dedication to the author's son, would lead one to anticipate.
The law of conversion is one of the most unsatisfactory depart-
ments. The very definition of conversion seems to be a stumb-
ling block. Bouvier's statement is quoted that conversion is "an
unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of ownership
over goods or personal chattels belonging to another, to the al-
teration of their condition or the exclusion of the owner's rights."
If there is no right of ownership there can be no exercise of it,
and one can be guilty of conversion though he knows that he has
no right of ownership. What is meant, probably, is the
doing by one having no right to do it of something to chattels
which only the owner has a right to do. The work filling 550
pages, is divided into 14 chapters, which deal with the nature
cf conversion; the things which may be converted, persons who
may be guilty of conversion, (a very comprehensive and satisfac-
tcry chapter) acts amounting to a conversion (which might logic-
ally have been presented in the first chapter) when demand of
the return and refusal to return the thing are necessary to con-
stitute conversion, who may sustain the action of trover; the ne-
cessity of title an possession; pleading (an instructive and com-
plete treatise) the waiver of conversion, evidence, the measure
of damages, the trial, and errors and appeals. Despite certain
infelicities of expressions, the book is a very complete manual on
its theme, and may be consulted by the practitioner with confi-
dence that he will find every thing of value, and some things
of no value at all, that the judges have written, on a theme that
was susceptible of clear and logical discussion, but which has
often been denied this advantage.
The mechanical execution of the work is in the superior style
that distinguishes all the publications of the eminent Boston pub-
lishing house.
It will repay any lawyer or student of law, to examine care-
fully this treatise, which, as its author states, is founded on over
6000 carefully studied cases.
